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PREPARED STATEMENT OF KEVIN K. WASHBURN 
ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA LAW SCHOOL 
 
BEFORE THE UNITED STATES SENATE 
COMMITTEE ON INDIAN AFFAIRS 
(JOHN MCCAIN, CHAIRMAN) 
 
WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 21, 2005 
 
The Indian gaming industry is one of  the most important sources of  governmental revenues 
for Indian tribes, but it will remain a healthy revenue source only as long as it is well 
regulated by tribal and federal officials.. 
 
Casino gaming is unlike any other lawful industry in that large amounts of  cash are spent 
and returned each day in millions of  transactions by thousands of  people all across the 
country.  In an age in which transactions in most other areas of  commerce are dominated by 
less fungible and more secure financial instruments, such as credit cards, debit cards and 
checks, casinos still predominantly operate with cash.  The cash intensive nature of  the 
gaming industry makes it particularly attractive – and particularly vulnerable – to crime and 
corruption.   
 
Crime and corruption has, for the most part, been carefully kept in check in Indian gaming 
through vigilant adherence by gaming regulators to two primary regulatory strategies: careful 
background investigations of  the key actors in Indian gaming, and strong internal control 
procedures for casino operations.  It is widely agreed within the industry that background 
investigations and internal controls are crucial to effective regulation and no reasonable 
commentator could seriously deny their importance and effectiveness in protecting the 
industry.  Thus, the key question is not whether these regulatory strategies are valuable and 
important, but which governments (tribal, federal, or state) should bear the ultimate 
responsibility for implementing these regulatory strategies. 
 
The regulation of  gaming has been plagued by a lack of  clarity in the roles of  the respective 
regulatory entities.  Now is an appropriate time for Congress to clarify those roles to provide 
better guidance to the industry and to regulators. 
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I. IN GENERAL, STATE GOVERNMENTS SHOULD NOT BE EXPECTED TO 
REGULATE INDIAN GAMING. 
 
When IGRA was enacted in 1988, most observers likely anticipated that states would use the 
compacting process to obtain a strong regulatory presence over Class III gaming.  Indeed, 
some state governments have strong, reliable and effective Indian gaming regulatory bodies 
that provide vital assistance in insuring the integrity of  Indian gaming.  However, states have 
not consistently undertaken regulatory efforts.  Congress should not count on states to 
handle these important tasks, for three main reasons.  First, while tribal and federal 
regulators view Indian gaming as an important tribal asset that they have a special obligation 
to protect, state regulators may not feel any particular responsibility to insure its long-term 
vitality.  Instead, they may view Indian gaming activity as simply another economic activity 
that must be regulated, reflecting less of  a commitment to the integrity of  the industry.  
Second, through tribal gaming revenue sharing with state governments, states may have an 
interest in maximizing gaming revenues, an interest that often overshadows any interest in 
strong gaming regulation.  This sets up a potential conflict of  interest.  Meeting regulatory 
requirements does, after all, affect the bottom line and can reduce gaming profits.  Finally, 
the lack of  a clear focus and strong state interest in the integrity of  Indian gaming leaves the 
industry vulnerable.  The quality of  regulation of  Indian casinos ought not exist at the mercy 
of  state budgetary cycles.   
 
Through the compact process in IGRA, states had the opportunity to become heavily 
involved in Indian gaming regulation.  While most states have shown a strong interest in 
tribal gaming revenues, few have shown significant interest in the actual regulation of  
gaming.  By and large, states have been “no-shows” in the important area of  regulation. 
Congress should respect their decision to “opt out” of  Indian gaming regulation. 
 
II A TRIBAL/FEDERAL REGULATORY MODEL IS LIKELY TO BE MOST 
RELIABLE. 
 
In my judgment, the primary responsibility for insuring that Indian casinos adopt and 
adhere to adequate internal controls ought to lie with tribal gaming regulators who 
already exercise a variety of  regulatory functions within Indian gaming operations.  
In the past ten years, a large and sophisticated community of  professional tribal gaming 
regulators has taken root across the country.  Tribal gaming regulators have proven 
themselves, in the main, as effective regulators.  In most circumstances, tribal regulators work 
conscientiously, competently and independently in providing strong regulation of  Indian 
casinos.  Recognizing their primacy in undertaking these sovereign responsibilities is likely to 
produce the most effective regulation. However, tribal regulatory structures have some 
obvious regulatory weaknesses and vulnerabilities that justify a strong oversight role 
for federal regulators, including the ability to take independent enforcement action 
where a tribal gaming commission fails to meet its sovereign responsibilities. 
 
While, in most areas of  policy, the important moral and legal principle of  tribal sovereignty 
ought to protect the right of  a tribal government to make regulatory decisions without 
federal oversight, Indian gaming is an exception to this principle.  I justify exceptionalism on 
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this basis: one of  the practical ramifications of  tribal sovereignty is that no tribe can be held 
accountable to any other tribe.  Yet, despite their legal insulation from one another and their 
lack of  mutual accountability, Indian tribes most certainly can take individual actions that 
harm other tribes.  In the highly politicized world of  Indian gaming, no tribe is an island 
unto itself.  Indeed, the political fallout from incompetent or corrupt actions of  one tribe 
may well impact hundreds of  other tribes across the country.  Indian gaming exists at the 
sufferance of  Congress and state legislatures and the public whom those bodies represent.  
If  one Indian casino succumbs to corruption, then the entire Indian gaming industry may 
well be tainted.  The integrity of  the industry – and even the perception of  integrity – must be 
guarded with vigilance. 
 
In Indian gaming, tribes are linked inextricably to one another.  Yet tribal sovereignty means 
that each tribe is independent of  one another and insulated from any legal responsibility to 
other tribes for its actions.  Because no tribe has the ability to regulate other sovereign tribes, 
this problem is one that tribes cannot solve themselves.  In my view, this lack of  
accountability of  one tribe to another justifies federal oversight to accomplish what tribes 
cannot achieve through collective action.  In other words, the federal government’s own 
sovereign authority in this area can offer sound regulatory coverage that tribes could never 
achieve on their own. 
  
Because of  the tremendous value of  gaming to Indian tribes, Congress and Indian tribes 
share a responsibility to ensure the continued health of  the Indian gaming industry.  While 
ninety-nine percent of  tribes may regulate responsibly ninety-nine percent of  the time, the 
occasional lapse affects not only the tribe that behaves irresponsibly, but also taints the 
regulatory efforts of  the hundreds of  tribes that exercise consistent and rigorous gaming 
regulation.  In this case, the stakes are sufficiently high to justify strong federal regulatory 
involvement.   
 
The risk of  occasional irresponsible behavior is quite real, for a couple of  reasons.1  First, 
the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act does not currently require that Indian tribes have 
independent tribal gaming commissions.  Many tribes have created gaming commissions, but 
the relative independence of  these commissions varies.  Tribal commissioners are sometimes 
directly accountable to tribal leaders and/or tribal voters.  While, in most circumstances, the 
tribal interest in the long term health of  the gaming operation will give each tribal regulator a 
strong incentive to regulate responsibly, there may occasionally be overwhelming temptation 
to cut regulatory corners for short term gains.   
 
In the licensure context, for example, I am aware of  one tribal gaming commission that 
denied a gaming license to persons with ties to organized crime and then reversed itself  and 
granted the license apparently after feeling pressure from tribal leaders.  While such 
circumstances are troubling, the dynamics that cause such action are entirely understandable.  
Where a lucrative opportunity is available to the tribe, the pressure on the tribal gaming 
commission to find a way to facilitate that opportunity may simply be overwhelming, even 
                                                          
1 I addressed these issues in greater detail in my testimony before this Committee on April 27, 2005.  A link to 
this testimony can be found at http://www.law.umn.edu/facultyprofiles/washburnk.htm. 
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though it poses serious risks.  In some circumstances, there may be a clear conflict of  
interest for tribal regulators.  For those tribes that make per capita payments of  gaming 
revenues to individual members, tribal regulators may have a direct financial interest in seeing 
a gaming development happen.  Such pressures, which are not unique to tribal governments, 
can undermine the quality of  regulation at the tribal level. 
 
Because of  these pressures and the natural conflicts of  interest of  tribal regulators, federal 
regulators have a comparative advantage.  Federal regulators are largely disinterested and 
objective; they have no significant conflicts of  interest because they achieve no direct or 
significant benefit from the development of  any particular Indian gaming facility.  Thus, 
having federal regulators serve an oversight role can help protect Indian gaming from the 
occasional lapses that might occur when tribal regulators succumb to pressures to cut 
corners.  Federal regulations can also serve another valuable function.  
 
Unlike individual tribal or state rules, uniform federal standards can assure the 
integrity of  gaming on a national scope and indirectly increase the quality and 
independence of  tribal regulators.  In the context of  internal controls, for example, the 
adoption of  uniform federal standards creates a baseline for quality of  regulation 
nationwide.  Creation of  such standards not only helps the consumer, it facilitates the 
independence of  tribal gaming commissioners by insuring that knowledge and expertise is 
portable from one reservation to another.  Nationwide standards assure a national network 
of  training and job opportunities that collectively serve to improve the professionalism of  
tribal gaming regulators.  If  a tribal regulator is fired from one reservation for applying the 
rules too rigorously, for example, he may well be able to find work with a gaming 
commission at another reservation.   
 
Admittedly, federal regulators cannot be as responsive to the unique needs and 
circumstances of  each individual tribe.  Moreover, technology and other relevant 
circumstances will change much more quickly than regulators can update a complex and 
comprehensive regulatory regime, such as the federal minimum internal controls standards.  
To address these disadvantages, tribal gaming commissions and federal regulators should be 
open-minded and sensible about allowing reasonable variances to the federal standards.  
Federal regulators should adopt standards that allow adequate flexibility at the tribal 
level. 
 
III. CLARIFYING FEDERAL REGULATORY AUTHORITY AND IMPROVING 
FEDERAL REGULATION. 
 
While all businesses chafe at regulation, Indian tribes are different than other regulated 
entities.  This difference is the source of  some key problems in Indian gaming and counsels 
in favor of  a unique approach.  First, as sovereign nations, Indian tribes are entitled to a 
greater level of  clarity than ordinary businesses when Congress mandates legal requirements.  
And the NIGC needs a clear Congressional mandate to establish its legitimacy.  Because it is 
in the best interest of  Indian gaming for an independent and objective regulator to oversee 
all significant gaming activity, Congress should strengthen the NIGC’s mandate over Class 
III gaming.  Congress should recognize that NIGC’s authority to assure the integrity 
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of  Indian gaming extends to Class III gaming activity for all purposes, including 
background investigations of  management contractors, minimum internal control 
standards, and health and safety regulations.   
 
Second, federal Indian gaming regulators must be cognizant of  the fact that it is sovereign 
governments they are regulating.  In my experience, many disputes between Indian tribes and 
the NIGC have arisen when federal regulators have behaved in a heavy-handed fashion.  
While such heavy-handedness is the norm within the commercial gaming industry in Nevada 
and New Jersey and other jurisdictions, the circumstances are far different in Indian gaming.  
Regulators in Nevada and New Jersey are regulating private actors, not sovereign nations.  
Federal regulators must behave much more carefully and much more respectfully toward the 
regulated industry.  To be effective, NIGC regulators must not merely be regulators, 
but also educators and diplomats.  While federal regulators must utilize a variety of  skills 
to achieve tribal compliance, over-reliance on aggressive regulatory tactics sometimes simply 
masks ineffectiveness.  Federal regulators should treat tribal regulators and tribal officials 
with the same respect and deference that they would show to state officials.   
 
CONCLUSION 
 
While each tribe has a moral right to the exclusive regulation of  its own affairs, this moral 
right clashes with political reality in the field of  Indian gaming where the actions of  one 
tribe can harm many other tribes.   
 
To protect the value of  Indian gaming as a resource for all tribes, Congress should recognize 
a clear and strong role for federal regulators.  For most tribes, which engage in responsible 
regulation of  Indian gaming, the NIGC role will be nearly invisible.  While a strong role for 
the NIGC clearly treads on tribal sovereignty, it is a pragmatic and necessary step to insure 
the long-term viability of  gaming as a resource for all tribes. 
 
Thank you for asking for my views on this important subject.2 
 
 
Kevin K. Washburn 
Associate Professor 
University of Minnesota Law School  
229 19th Avenue South 
N226 Walter Mondale Hall 
Minneapolis, MN 55455 
email:  kkw@umn.edu 
phone:  612-624-3869 
fax:   612-625-2011  
 http://www.law.umn.edu/facultyprofiles/washburnk.htm 
                                                          
2 I offer the views set forth above solely as an individual academic and do not purport to speak for the 
University of Minnesota, the State of Minnesota, or any other entity or person. 
